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Summary 
Theories of  the hospital market view hospitals as  competing for patients, physi-
cians and third-party payers simultaneously. The  competition involves such elements 
as price, quality, convenience, technology and innovation and the effects of  the com-
petition in the market affect the quality of care, clinical outcomes, cost of services, ac-
cess as well as patient satisfaction. 
The purpose of the paper is to shed some light on the impact of competition on 
the performance of  general hospitals in  Poland. Due to the unavailability of  micro-
level data, territorial concentration based on regional data is  used as  a proxy for the 
scope of competition. Therefore, the territorial concentration of hospital beds is mea-
sured with the use of  the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for each of  the 16 
provinces of Poland and for the four-year period of 2008-2011. In the second stage, 
the values of the concentration index are correlated with a set of variables describing 
the performance of hospitals. 
The results show that the concentration of hospital beds in the regions is uneven. 
The regions with the most concentrated markets (zachodniopomorskie, łódzkie, pod-
laskie and mazowieckie) are characterized by four times higher values of  the HHI 
than the one with the least concentrated market (śląskie). The  results suggest that 
a higher concentration in  the hospital market correlates with a  larger number of pa-
tients treated and an increase in  the cost of services.
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Hospitals constitute a  central subsector of  health care systems in  every 
developed country. In Poland there are around 800 general hospitals and hos-
pital expenditures are the single-most important component of health spend-
ing, with a  share of 35,4 percent of  the total in 2010. The financing of hos-
pitals absorbs 47 percent of the public payer’s budget and amounts to around 
2,3 percent of GDP. Not surprisingly, the performance of hospitals is exposed 
to vivid interest from all major stakeholders of  the health care system. Pa-
tients, purchasers, employers, providers and policy-makers are all concerned 
with the functioning of  the in-patient care in Poland. The concern is due to 
malfunctioning of the hospital services market. The availability of several pro-
cedures is  low leading to long waiting times, while tight budget constraints 
together with inefficient management result in  permanent debts and losses 
of numerous publicly and local authority owned providers. 
One of  the recent policies targeted to tackle hospital sector problems 
around the world is the increase of competition mechanisms in hospital mar-
kets. Competition-enhancing policies have been introduced or fostered in an 
increasing number of countries in last ten years. The United States, the Unit-
ed Kingdom and the Netherlands were among the first to strengthen compe-
tition mechanisms in  the hospital industry and recently more of  the OECD 
countries have followed their competition policies being motivated with rap-
id increases in health spending1. 
The experience of  Poland with competition in  hospital services started 
in  the late 1990s with an introduction of  a purchaser-provider split2. Since 
then, all providers (including hospitals) that meet certain criteria have been 
allowed to compete for contracts signed with the National Health Fund 
(Narodowy Fundusz Zdrowia – NFZ) which is  the main third-party pay-
er in  the system. Contracts in  the in-patient care can be awarded by means 
of competitive tenders or negotiations. The principal rules for the competition 
mechanisms based on the separation of the purchaser and providers have not 
changed since their introduction and the competition between hospitals has 
 1 OECD, Competition in  Hospital Services, www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/50527122.pdf, 
Paris 2012, p. 9 (18.06.2013).
 2 The  separation of  the provider and purchaser in  publicly funded health care systems en-
ables competition to develop among providers and is  seen as  a mean to increase technical 
efficiency of  providers (see T. Ashton, D. Press, Market concentration in  secondary health ser-
vices under a  purchaser-provider split: the New Zealand experience, „Health Economics”, Vol.  6, 
No. 1/1997, p. 43).
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not led to positive results. The in-patient services market in Poland still lacks 
financial stability and patients’ satisfaction from using hospital services is  low. 
The reasons for the malfunctioning of the hospital sector, and generally health 
care, are subject to heated debate in Poland. Interestingly, the issue of compe-
tition is not present in  the debate dominated by the problem of  the funding 
level and in  Polish literature, there are no empirical contributions concerned 
with the consequences of hospital competition. 
The purpose of  the empirical analysis conducted below is  to shed some 
light on the impact of market concentration on the performance of  the Pol-
ish hospital sector. To do so, a territorial concentration of hospital infrastruc-
ture is used as a proxy for market concentration. Both the theory of econom-
ics and extensive empirical evidence suggest that, other things being equal, 
the concentration of  firms is  an important element of  the market structure 
and a  determinant of  competition3. The  concentration is  measured with the 
use of  the Herfindahl-Hirschaman index and its values are correlated with 
indicators describing the performance of hospitals in  the regions of Poland. 
The succeeding parts of  the paper address the following issues: overview 
of  competition concept in  health care; description of  dataset and methods 
used; results; and conclusions.
1. overview of competition concept  
as applied to hospital sector 
Under certain conditions, competition maximizes social welfare by bring-
ing about an efficient provision of health care services with a socially optimal 
combination of price and quality4. Unfortunately, markets for hospital servic-
es differ extensively from the characteristics of a competitive market. The sup-
ply of  hospital services is  differentiated due to a  highly heterogonous na-
ture of the product and oligopolistic market structure. From the demand side, 
there are several issues regarding information asymmetry. Additionally, the 
presence of not-for-profit providers deviates the hospital sector from standard 
competitive market assumptions5. Moreover, there are legal, economic and so-
cial barriers for entering and exiting the market. The in-patient services mar-
 3 S.A. Rhoades, The  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, „Federal Reserve Bulletin”, Vol.  79, 
No. 3/1993, p. 188-189.
 4 L.C. Baker, Measuring Competition in  Health Care Markets, „Health Services Research”, 
Vol. 36, No. 1/2001, Part II, p. 223.
 5 OECD, op.  cit., p. 29. 
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ket is also characterized by very high transaction costs. As the basic competi-
tion assumptions are not fulfilled in  the hospital sector, theory provides only 
limited guidance under what conditions and when competition leads to de-
sirable outcomes. 
The theories of  the hospital market view hospitals as  competing for pa-
tients, physicians and third-party payers simultaneously6. Competition involves 
such elements as price, quality, convenience, technology and innovation7. Nu-
merous studies report the impact of  competition on hospital performance, 
namely the quality of  treatment, clinical outcomes, cost of  services, access 
as  well as  patient satisfaction. The  evidence on the impact of  competition 
is ambiguous though, and a recent review of 53 studies concerned with com-
petition in health care reports differentiated conclusions, e.g. that clinical out-
comes are improved with increased competition in the United Kingdom, while 
the evidence from other countries suggest that these outcomes are reduced8. 
This vagueness probably reflect the fact that the success of competition often 
hinges on a regulatory and institutional settings adapted in a particular coun-
try as well as on responses from stakeholders of the system. Hence, a success-
ful introduction of  competition in  health care often depends on the design 
of appropriate regulation9.
2. data 
The availability of  data on health care providers’ activities in  Poland 
is  limited. Even information on the publicly owned entities is not published 
and the public statistics system covers only aggregated data. The  level of  ag-
gregation varies for particular measures. For the purpose of  the empirical 
analysis conducted here, the data used need to be disaggregated at least to 
the district (powiat) level. Using district-level data for each of  the provinc-
es (województwo) allows to identify the concentration of  hospital activities 
in each of  the provinces. 
 6 I.C. Harris, R.R. McDaniel, Untangling healthcare competition, „Health Progress”, Vol. 74, 
No. 9/1993, p. 20-21.
 7 P.A. Rivers, S.H. Glover, Health care competition, strategic mission, and patient satisfaction: 
Research model and propositions, „Journal of  Health Organization and Management”, Vol.  22, 
No. 6/2008, p. 628.
 8 The  Health Foundation, Competition in  healthcare, http://www.health.org.uk/publications/
competition-in-healthcare, p. 1 (18.06.2013).
 9 OECD, op.  cit., p. 29.
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The most appropriate measures of  hospital activity and the ones which 
are used frequently are the numbers of  beds, discharger and patient days10. 
Due to the unavailability of  other indicators, the measure used in  this study 
is  the number of beds in general hospitals in each of  the districts of Poland. 
The performance of hospitals is described with a set of following indica-
tors: (1) number of  patients treated per hospital bed; (2) number of  patient 
days per capita; (3) average length of  stay; (4) bed occupancy rate and (5) 
cost of services covered by the NFZ per 10.000 population expressed in con-
stant prices. 
The timespan of  the analysis covers the period of  2008-2011. A multi-
period approach allows for investigating the dynamics of  territorial concen-
tration. 
The data on the number of beds, hospital activities as well as cost of ser-
vices is  collected from various sources, namely: Local Data Bank11 (Bank 
Danych Lokalnych), annual reports of  the National Health Fund12 (NFZ) 
as well as Ministry of Health Statistical Bulletin13. 
3. methods 
There are two stages of concentration analysis in this research. In the first 
stage, the territorial concentration of hospital beds in each of the 16 provinc-
es (pl. województwo) of Poland is calculated using the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index. The concentration index is  based on district (pl. powiat) level data. In 
the second stage, the values of the HHI are correlated with various measures 
of hospital performance, to test for possible relationships between the concen-
tration of providers and performance of  the general hospitals sector. 
The research uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), which is  the 
most common measure of concentration used in empirical research. The HHI 
is  a statistical measure that can be used to measure concentration in  a vari-
ety of contexts, e.g. market or territorial concentration. The index accounts for 
the number of firms as well as their concentration, by incorporating the rela-
tive size of all firms in a market14. 
 10 L.C. Baker, op.  cit., p. 239.
 11 GUS, Local Data Bank, http://www.stat.gov.pl/bdlen/app/strona.html?p_name=indeks 
(18.06.2013).
 12 NFZ, Sprawozdanie z działalności Narodowego Funduszu Zdrowia za 2011 rok, Warszawa 
2012 (and previous issues).
 13 CSIOZ, Biuletyn Statystyczny Ministerstwa Zdrowia, Warszawa 2012 (and previous issues).
 14 S.A. Rhoades, op.  cit., p. 188.
504	 BłażEJ	łyszczarz
EKonoMia	 i	Prawo.	EconoMics	and	Law,	VoL.	13,	no.	4/2014
The HHI is  calculated by summing the squares of  percentage market 
shares held by all the firms in a market investigated, as  follows: 





n – number of firms in  the market,
MSi – market share of  the i-th firm. 
In the above formula, MSi represents a firm’s market share, but it can al-
so stand for territorial concentration. The  latter interpretation of  the HHI 
is used in  the empirical analysis here. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index determines how uneven the distri-
bution of  hospital beds is, compared with a  uniform distribution. The  value 
of the HHI increases with the degree of territorial concentration reaching its 
upper level of 1 if all the hospital beds in a province are concentrated in one 
district. The  minimum value of  the index is  1/n, which means that hospital 
beds are distributed evenly across all the districts. Thus, a  lower value of  the 
HHI indicates a  less territorially concentrated hospital market in  the prov-
ince investigated15.
4. results 
The results of empirical analysis are reported in two stages. The first stage 
is  concerned with the values of  the HHI in  the provinces of  Poland in  the 
years of  2008-2011. In the second stage, an attempt is  made to identify the 
association between territorial concentration and performance of general hos-
pitals.
4.1. concentration as an indicator of competition among hospitals  
in poland 
The average value of  the HHI for the regions of  Poland diminished 
slightly for the four years investigated and varied from 0,1461 in  2008 to 
0,1451 in 2011 (table 1). 
The highest values of the HHI in each of the years was observed in zach-
odniopomorskie, łódzkie, podlaskie and mazowieckie provinces. Therefore, 
these provinces were the ones characterized by the greatest territorial concen-
 15 C. Campos, The Geographical Concentration of Industries, http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/re-
gional-trends/regional-economic-analysis/the-geographical-concentration-of-industries/art-geo-
graphical-concentration.html, p. 13 (18.06.2013).
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tration in the hospital sector. The values of the HHI in these provinces fluctu-
ated around 0,2, while in the region with the 5th highest HHI (małopolskie) 
it  was considerably lower and reached the level of  0,176 in  2009. The  high 
values of  the HHI in  the four aforementioned regions reflect considerable 
concentration of  hospital beds in  their capitals. The  cities of  Łódź, Warsaw, 
Szczecin and Białystok are characterized by a 41-43 percent share of all hos-
pital beds in  the respective provinces. Such a  distribution of  hospital infra-
structure might affect both the performance of  the hospital sector as  well 
as  inequities in access to services.
Table 1. Values of  the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for territorial concentration in  the provinces of Poland
ProVincE
VaLuE	of thE	hErfindahL-hirschMan	 indEx
2008 2009 2010 2011
dolnośląskie 0.1490 0.1444 0.1401 0.1320
kujawsko-pomorskie 0.1468 0.1461 0.1462 0.1408
lubelskie 0.1341 0.1360 0.1281 0.1298
lubuskie 0.1203 0.1192 0.1196 0.1212
łódzkie 0.1992 0.2078 0.2075 0.2064
małopolskie 0.1725 0.1757 0.1715 0.1700
mazowieckie 0.2083 0.2062 0.1984 0.1984
opolskie 0.1490 0.1481 0.1526 0.1525
podkarpackie 0.0779 0.0777 0.0781 0.0797
podlaskie 0.2084 0.2020 0.2115 0.2020
pomorskie 0.1478 0.1499 0.1513 0.1496
śląskie 0.0515 0.0500 0.0502 0.0503
świętokrzyskie 0.1171 0.1192 0.1288 0.1331
warmińsko-mazurskie 0.0957 0.0967 0.0968 0.1083
wielkopolskie 0.1477 0.1502 0.1495 0.1483
zachodniopomorskie 0.2126 0.2045 0.1975 0.1992
Average value 0.1461 0.1459 0.1455 0.1451
Source: own calculations based on Central Statistical Office, the National Health Fund and Ministry of Health data. 
The province with the lowest level of territorial concentration of hospital 
beds in each of  the years was śląskie; the HHI for the region varied slightly 
above the level of  0,05, which means that the concentration was four times 
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lower than in  the provinces with the greatest concentration level. The  sec-
ond and the third regions with the least concentrated general hospitals mar-
kets were podkarpackie and warmińsko-mazurskie, respectively. The  low level 
of concentration in śląskie reflects the highly urbanized character of the prov-
ince and the fact that there are numerous cities of relatively similar size there. 
Also, the concentration of hospital infrastructure in provincial capital is  very 
low; only 13,6 percent of beds is  located in  the city of Katowice. 
The analysis of the HHI dynamics does not reveal any clear trend in con-
centration. In most of the provinces the HHI increased in some of the years, 
while decreased in  other periods. The  exceptions are świętkorzyskie and 
warmińsko-mazurskie, where the HHI values increased in  every investigated 
year, as  well as  dolnośląskie, where the opposite tendency was observed and 
concentration decreased in every consecutive year.
4.2. concentration as a determinant of hospital performance in poland 
The dispersion of  the HHI values indicates that territorial concentration 
of  the hospital market is  differentiated in  the regions of  Poland. An impor-
tant issue is whether these differences in concentration affect the performance 
of  the hospital market in  the regions. 
In order to investigate potential relationships between the measure 
of concentration and the performance of providers, a set of variables describ-
ing activities of  hospitals is  used. Basic descriptive statistics for each of  the 
five indicators and for the year 2008 as well as 2011 are reported in  table 2.









Number of patients treated (patients/hospital bed/
year)
43.8 3.1 43.5 3.3
Number of  patient days per capita (days/capita/
year)
1.21 0.14 1.14 0.12
Average length of stay (days) 5.86 0.51 5.56 0.43
Bed occupancy rate (per cent) 70.2 3.4 66.5 2.7
Real cost of services per 10.000 pop.* (thousands 
of złoties)
5379 406 6967 462
* – for deflation purposes: 2010=100.
Source: As  in  table 1. 
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The dynamics of  the indicators denote a decreasing intensity of hospital 
activities in  the four-year period under investigation. Both the average num-
ber of  patients treated per hospital bed as  well as  the mean quantity of  pa-
tient days per capita diminished over the period. Similarly, the average length 
of  stay in  hospital decreased and the consequence of  these trends is  a lower 
bed occupancy rate. The  only indicator the value of  which increased during 
the period was the real cost of  services paid by the NFZ. The  increase was 
quite substantial, the real expenditure for hospital services in  2011 increased 
by 29,5 percent comparing to 2008. 
The relationships between the HHI values and the hospital performance 
measures were examined with the use of  a simple correlation. The  values 
of Pearson correlation coefficient are reported in  table 3.
Table  3.  Values of  correlation coefficient between the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and the hospital per-
formance measures
PatiEnts_trEat PatiEnt_days LEngth_stay BEd_occuP cost_sErVicEs
2008
HHI 0.145 -0.067 -0.163 -0.023 0.325
2009
HHI 0.356 0.016 -0.285 0.233 0.552**
2010
HHI 0.442* -0.015 -0.413 0.070 0.414
2011
HHI 0.498** -0.054 -0.395 0.211 0.542**
For description of variables used see table 2.
**, * – coefficient significant at 5 and 10 probability levels, respectively.
Source: As  in  table 1. 
The values of  the correlation coefficient show that in  some of  the cas-
es significant relationships between territorial concentration and the measures 
of  hospital performance were observed. Interestingly, the correlations for the 
year 2008 are considerably weaker from those observed in  later periods. For 
the three recent years the relationships are more unambiguous in most of the 
cases. The discussion of the results below refers to the data from period 2009-
2011. 
There is  a positive and quite strong correlation between the HHI and 
two variables, namely, the number of  patients treated per hospital bed and 
cost of services. The positive sign of the relationship between territorial con-
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centration and cost of services is reasonable. If the definition of the HHI ap-
plied here reflects competition in hospital services correctly, than, one might 
expect a higher average cost of services paid by the NFZ in the regions with 
a  higher values of  the index. This can be explained by a  higher monopo-
listic power of  hospitals operating in  regions with more concentrated mar-
kets. On  the other hand, a  positive association between the number of  pa-
tients treated and the HHI is  counterintuitive. It  denotes that the number 
of patients treated per bed yearly increases with a higher market concentra-
tion. In other words, lower competition is associated with more efficient us-
age of hospital beds. 
The relationship between the HHI and average length of stay is negative 
and it means that lower competition is associated with shorter stays in hospi-
tals. It is not clear how to interpret this result in terms of efficiency. A short-
er stay in  hospital might be both efficiency-enhancing (if duration of  stays 
tend to be too long and generate unnecessary costs) and efficiency-deterio-
rating (if stays tend to be too short and endanger patients’ health status). This 
relationship is not statistically significant, though, and needs to be interpret-
ed with caution. 
Lower values of  the correlation coefficient characterize the relationship 
between the HHI and two other variables, i.e. patient days and bed occupan-
cy rate. Particularly, in  the case of  the first of  these, the relationship is  ex-
tremely weak.
conclusions 
The above analysis proved that the distribution of hospital beds is uneven. 
Hence, the concentration of  in-patient services is diversified across the prov-
inces of Poland. Whether the territorial concentration can be used as a proxy 
of  competition is  not undisputable. Unfortunately, the unavailability of  mi-
cro-level data makes it  impossible to conduct the analysis with more accu-
rate information. 
Agreeing with the use of  territorial concentration as  a proxy of  compe-
tition, one might draw some conclusions on the competition impact on the 
performance of  hospitals. Particularly, it  was shown that lower competition 
is associated with higher average costs of services provided and a higher num-
ber of patients treated. 
An introduction or a  reinforcement of  competition in  the hospital mar-
ket is  not an obvious solution to enhance efficiency or to limit the growth 
of health care costs. In the recent literature, it is confirmed that for the com-
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petition forces to be effective, several conditions need to be met16. Firstly, 
a  range of  accessible options is  a prerequisite for enabling patients to have 
choice in  healthcare. Secondly, patients need to be interested and capable 
of  choosing among services. What is  more, relevant and understandable in-
formation need to be available to make well-informed choices. Finally, hos-
pital staff must be responsive to financial incentives, which means that hos-
pitals’ revenues should be linked to a  number of  patients17. Hospital market 
competition arrangements in  Poland do not meet all of  the above condi-
tions. Although the choice of provider is extensive, and patients are interest-
ed in  choosing among services, one might conclude that information on the 
quality of  services provided by particular hospitals is  not sufficient to make 
rational choices. Moreover, there are doubts about the efficiency of  financial 
incentives in the provider payment system, which lead to a situation in which 
hospitals are not interested in treating some cases, particularly those which are 
priced unprofitably by the purchaser.
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